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Bits of Autobiography:  
Radical Deindividualization  
and Everydayness
In a typically biting 1897 essay titled “The Short Story,” Ambrose Bierce critiques William Dean Howells, at the time 
the reigning practitioner of realism and America’s foremost critic of 
literature. Bierce calls attention to the lack of any structuring events 
and the paucity of representations of the exceptional, or of what he 
terms “imagination,” in Howells’s championed mode of realism. How-
ells, Bierce claims, can only produce art from what he has directly expe-
rienced and that, unfortunately, has been strictly limited to the banal 
worries and anxieties of the class of Americans to which he belongs. 
Howells’s friends and acquaintances do not, according to Bierce, consti-
tute a subject worthy of literature. He writes:
The magazine story must relate nothing: like Dr. Hern’s “holes” 
in the luminiferous ether, it is something in which nothing can 
occur. . . . The master of this detestable school of literature is 
Mr. Howells. Absolutely destitute of that supreme and sufficient 
literary endowment, imagination, he does, not what he would, 
but what he can—takes note with his eyes and ears and “writes 
them up” as does any other reporter. He can tell nothing that he 
has not seen or heard, and in his personal progress through the 
rectangular streets and between the trim hedges of Philistia, 
with the lettered old maids of his acquaintance curtseying from 
the door-ways, he has seen and heard nothing worth telling. Yet 
tell it he must, and having told, defend. (243) 
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Representations of particularity, exceptional and individualizing 
moments, thus form the missing elements that, for Bierce, mark the dif-
ference between serious literature and the middlebrow realistic fiction 
promoted by the school of Howells. For something rather than “noth-
ing” to occur, Bierce argues that literature must give up the perspective 
associated with the journalistic gaze constructed through the figure of 
the author-as-narrator. 
In effect Bierce here defends his own mode of writing, which might 
be more closely identified with the literary mode of romance, against 
this form of realistic representation on the grounds of his application of 
the imagination to what he terms the “impenetrable motives” of men 
and women. Bierce believes that only by escaping the bounds of generic 
experience, which he understood as necessarily limited, can one create 
a story “worth telling,” and more, worth reading. More specifically, 
Bierce worries that the mode of realism he finds in Howells attempts to 
turn what, for him, amounted to his most horrific discovery—that one 
can be made into or make oneself a generic person—into the basis for 
the literary representation of life. What could seem comforting to some-
one like Howells appears for Bierce a fate worse than death. He believes 
that to represent a subject in general terms means inflicting a radical 
loss of individuality on that subject, for it means imagining that subject 
as anyone or no one in particular. In his critique of Howells, Bierce 
links the generic generality of Howellsian realism to what he sees as the 
anonymous common story. When used in autobiography that common 
story becomes masochistic, a form of deindividualizing violence directed 
toward the self. 
Bierce’s disagreement with Howells concerns a shift in the under-
standing of everydayness or common, shared identity. Nineteenth-cen-
tury realism was invested in the representation of the common. In order 
to represent the world as it really was, in other words to make a claim on 
reality, authors working within this tradition needed to carefully manage 
the creation of commonness. One way in which these authors, and How-
ells in particular, produced the effect of realism was to include the repre-
sentation of an anomalous figure that could then be excluded from the 
field of the common.1 In the later years of the nineteenth century, such 
aesthetics were no longer capable of producing a sense of comfort. Once 
faith in shared identity is lost, the deindividuation that has been under-
stood to be required by literary realism becomes an obsessive concern. 
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Bierce’s own literary work is interested in the phenomenology of 
his particularity of experience, even at the cost of admitting the insig-
nificance of this experience. The events selected by Bierce for textual 
representation are partial, personal, and punctual, qualities evident 
both in the title of his autobiographical collection, Bits of Autobiogra-
phy, and in many of the eleven “bits” selected for this collection: “A 
Little of Chickamauga,” “What I Saw of Shiloh,” “Four Days in Dixie,” 
and “A Sole Survivor.” These titles all suggest Bierce’s partial, even 
narrow, scope. From the limited period of “four days” to the extent of 
what was visible in “what I saw,” these titles do not solidify experience 
into authoritative narrative; they are bits of experience that have 
broken off, or have been broken off, from some potentially more mean-
ingful larger story. While seven of his eleven narrative bits cover his 
experiences during the war, he frames the collection with, at one end, 
his 1861 initiation into battle. The concluding bit is a lonely and mel-
ancholic meditation on outliving all his friends and peers as a single, 
solitary remainder of the past.
Unlike Henry Adams or Henry James, two of the major autobiogra-
phers of the period, Bierce’s short autobiographical bits do not make 
any explicit attempt to connect his personal history to that of the 
nation. This is so even though his narrative life begins not with his 
birth in 1842 but twenty-one years later, in the summer of 1861, when 
he left home to join the Ninth Indiana Volunteers. His limited scope, 
in terms of both form and the content, restricts the applicability of any 
insights gained to larger interpretive frameworks. We should, of course, 
have doubts that Bierce would have ever written a large and “complete” 
autobiography like that of Ulysses S. Grant, whose bestselling The Per-
sonal Memoirs of Ulysses S. Grant (1885) was perhaps one of the few 
autobiographies of the period that stuck close to genre conventions and 
the long form. Bierce was, after all, a relentless critic of the novel form 
and what he saw as its unnecessary and distracting length. When, to 
take one telling example, he narrates his experiences during the battle 
at Chickamauga, we do not find any resolution capable of producing a 
tight linkage to the meaning of the Civil War as a whole; there is an 
active destruction, a deferral of larger meaning in his texts. Not unlike 
the “private histories” found in several stories and sketches written by 
Mark Twain, Bierce’s narrative never rises out of his personal experi-
ences within the fog of war. The same applies to his representation of 
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the Civil War in general. 
In Bierce’s own work, both the “bit” and the “common story” that 
he critiques in Howells serve similarly to deindividuate individuals. 
The anomalous story, either that of a bit that was once whole, and thus 
no longer an individual, or a hypersubjective personality that cannot 
integrate bits of experience into a larger meaningful narrative. In order 
to draw out the distinctions between what I am calling the radical ano-
nymity of the bit and the comforting commonplace of the generic 
whole, we can examine two other authors’ roughly contemporary fic-
tional representations of war. Both demonstrate how an individual can 
become anonymous through the stripping of identity, down to the nub. 
This is the rendering of a person into small bits before subsequently 
fusing them into a new whole. These works also show how the military 
was imagined and represented as capable of producing radical anonym-
ity prior to the Second World War and the advent of the new media 
culture that, Paul Fussell argues, stripped “individual personality” from 
the newly “uniform and anonymous” military (66–67).2 
In a crucial scene from Stephen Crane’s The Red Badge of Courage 
(1895) that appears prior to the first battle, Crane describes Henry 
Fleming, his young antihero, as undergoing a transformation that results 
in the loss of his individuality: “He became not a man but a member. He 
felt that something of which he was a part—a regiment, an army, a 
cause, or a country—was in crisis. He was welded into a common per-
sonality which was dominated by a single desire” (26). The language of 
machine technology, the process by which he was “welded” into another 
subjectivity, or what Crane calls a “common personality,” that was not 
his alone but shared by all the other young men, gives us a figure for the 
extent to which Fleming has become anonymous. The crisis is under-
stood as requiring Fleming’s consent to be transformed from a part into 
a member of a new whole.3 A fantasy logic is at work in this passage: 
there is a split or rupture within a unit (“a regiment, an army, a cause, 
or a country”) that is presented as breaking a former wholeness that 
requires the subject’s assent to patch up. It is only through his choice to 
become a “member,” an anonymous soldier, that The Red Badge’s “youth” 
can finally become a man.
While Crane represents the war narrative as requiring the produc-
tion of an anonymous group prior to entering battle, Mark Twain imag-
ines the remainders of war—those killed in such a battle—as similarly 
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anonymized. A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur’s Court (1889) con-
cludes in a horrific battle that because of the anachronistic introduction 
of late nineteenth-century firearms against the twelfth-century oppo-
nents results in a complete massacre. Twain’s transported technologist 
of war, Hank Morgan, describes the scene: “As to the destruction of life, 
it was amazing. Moreover, it was beyond estimate. Of course we could 
not count the dead, because they did not exist as individuals but merely 
as homogenous protoplasm, with alloys of iron and buttons” (396). 
Torn to bits by these out-of-place bullets, the knight-soldiers are, like 
Henry Fleming and his peers, combined into a larger, anonymous unit. 
Twain’s representation of this scene allies the technological to the 
mathematical sublime by rendering the dead uncountable in their indi-
viduality. Reduced to protoplasmic parts, and not even identifiably 
human parts but those produced by machines—the already deindividu-
ated, amalgamated commodities of buttons and iron—the pile of former 
soldiers signifies anything but the generic. While the generic signifies a 
lack of individuating predicates that can still represent a type or cate-
gory, the radically anonymous is essentially dispensable, a reproducible 
throwaway that derives value not from the ability to stand in for a larger 
whole but from adding, bodily as in Twain’s protoplasm, to the whole.
Yet radical anonymity isn’t the sole province of disfiguring war nar-
ratives. We find versions of the “precariousness of personal identity . . . 
at the moment of its disintegration” that Sharon Cameron groups under 
the name “impersonality” in many works of American literature of the 
nineteenth century (viii). Think of Edgar Allan Poe’s proto-cyborg 
general of “The Man That Was Used Up,” who is composed and decom-
posed by anonymous publicly circulated discourse—gossip—and the 
oddly impersonal personage who haunts London’s crowded urban 
locales in “The Man of the Crowd.” These two stories enable us to draw 
connections between the anonymity associated with war and that of 
the crowd. The latter story exposes that even particularity might just be 
another marker of radical anonymity—the otherwise featureless “coun-
tenance of the singular being” belonging to that anonymous old stranger 
trailed by Poe’s narrator (221). This stranger is thus situated at precisely 
the junction of the personal and the impersonal. Poe, as always, helps 
to expose the perverseness of commonplace scenes and situations. As 
more people shift into urban living—the rapid expansion of cities in 
America did not really take off until after the war—realism becomes 
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more about representing the flow of large numbers of people and the 
transformation of social types into anonymous and autonomous figures.4
As this nineteenth-century realist tradition gives way to twentieth-
century modernism, we see a shift from the comforting generality to the 
masses of anonymous, rather than anomalous, figures in cities. Maurice 
Blanchot exposes the conditions of what might make this version of 
anonymity so horrifying to Bierce through his conception of what he, 
after Henri Lefebvre, terms “everyday experience.” If we think of How-
ells’s comforting generic life of the middle class as being structured and 
threatened by those uncanny, weird figures that he describes as not 
belonging to the space of the general, we begin to see how Bierce’s first-
person authored texts constantly restage a transformation from a state 
of particularity to anonymous subjectivity. The space of anonymous 
subjectivity in Blanchot is the ongoing eventlessness of “day-to-day 
life” in the urban street. The term “everyday” carries with it a sense of 
repetition implicit in its name. One enters into the repetitive flow of 
the everyday, as one enters into the street, as a subject without qualities, 
a subject without predicates. It is, as Blanchot describes, human but 
at the same time it is a human space without particularity: “In the 
everyday we have no name, little personal reality, scarcely a face, just as 
we have no social determination to sustain or enclose us” (17).5 The 
crowds and the streets function to strip particularity from the subject 
and render it anonymous. If Howells happily represents himself or his 
characters as deindividualized individuals, it is because they belong to 
the genteel tradition of nineteenth-century realism of the everyday as 
centered in the generic, not the anonymous. The anonymous are those 
without particularity, those without faces.6 
Against this mute anonymity, Bierce tries to introduce fragments 
that can once again individuate. Fragmented narratives, because they are 
not part of a whole or a cycle, might make it possible to avoid the repeti-
tiveness associated with the anonymity of the everyday. The opening 
narrative bit of Bits of Autobiography, “On a Mountain,” centers on one of 
the many small and uncounted events of the Civil War. He writes: “It has 
not got into history, but it had a real objective existence, although by a 
felicitous afterthought called by us who were defeated a ‘reconnaissance 
in force’” (656). This autobiographical sketch, like all of Bierce’s war 
stories, deflates any imagined heroism of war. He neither defends nor 
recalls any of his own actions.  The event, as Bierce explains, lacks any 
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representation, because it was deemed an utter failure and did not con-
tribute to a progressive narrative capable of marching toward success. 
But if the event remains uncounted, an even worse outcome is 
given to all the soldiers. Rather than tabulating a list of goals or mis-
sions accomplished and actions performed, Bierce describes the trans-
formation of his fellow union soldiers into anonymous, faceless things: 
“As we trudged on we passed something—some things—lying by the 
wayside. During another wait we examined them, curiously lifting the 
blankets from their yellow-clay faces” (658–59). Bierce’s depiction of 
an initially perceived unified “something” that, on closer inspection, 
separates into “some things” forms the first half of his attempt to make 
these men present. The second turns on a second transformation:
Repassing the spot the next day, a beaten, dispirited and 
exhausted force, feeble from fatigue and savage from defeat, 
some of us had life enough left, such as it was, to observe that 
these bodies had altered their position. They appeared also to 
have thrown off some of their clothing, which lay near by, in 
disorder. Their expression, too, had an added blankness—they 
had no faces. (659)
Ending with this image of a field filled with fellow, but unidentifiable, 
union soldiers, Bierce captures these now upturned and faceless bodies. 
Stripped of clothing and of any marking details, he describes them as 
completely lacking identity. The victims of a second attack, a herd of 
hungry pigs, these men who were nameless in history are made doubly 
so by Bierce’s rendering them faceless. 
The anomalous bit of detail in this narrative is the absence of the 
face as index of particularity, of individuality. A simple section marker, 
an asterisk, separates the before from the after of the event; formally, 
this division repeats the formula that structures the majority of Bierce’s 
fictional tales in which a final “reveal” exposes formerly unexposed 
information that produces a doubling back that leads to a reinterpreta-
tion of the story. By deploying this formal device, by marking the final 
anonymity of these de-figured bodies as a supplement, Bierce’s narrative 
insists on the “real objective existence” of this event and these men. 
His bit of complex narrative doesn’t produce a more “accurate” history, 
but rather seeks to restore something missing from history through the 
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inclusion of an element of unknowing, an unrecoverable knowledge of 
the event. This horrifying anonymity forces any reconstructed history 
to acknowledge its desire to exclude these moments of radical deindi-
vidualization in pursuit of writing the definitive account.
To render such a previously unrepresented event that he under-
stands to have a “real objective existence” in the world of representa-
tion, Bierce needs to produce a shock that will disrupt the general story. 
To extract from memory these bits of individual experience and add 
them as a supplement to the official account is, for Bierce, to write a 
better history. Like “On a Mountain,” the fragment titled “The Crime 
at Pickett’s Mill” concerns these sorts of events: 
There is a class of events which by their nature, and despite 
any intrinsic interest that they may possess, are foredoomed  
to oblivion. They are merged in the general story of those 
greater events of which they were a part, as the thunder of a 
billow breaking on a distant beach is unnoted in the continu-
ous roar. (684) 
Bierce avoids the writing of a “general story of those greater events” in 
favor of the condensed and compact story of what might be called the 
unnoted smaller events. Just as there are no representations of his child-
hood—or any experience prior to his transformation into an anonymous 
member of the Union Army—there are no moments of transcendence 
in which he takes stock of the entire event of the Civil War. 
In his now somewhat neglected literary history of the 1890s, Larzer 
Ziff makes an interesting observation that connects Bierce’s relation 
with everyday life to his fragmented war narratives: Bierce may have 
turned to his Civil War experience as a way of dealing with a certain 
repetitiveness of everyday life in fin-de-siècle America. While Howells 
might be said to have found comfort in the generalizing qualities of the 
everyday, Ziff presents us with a Bierce as disturbed by the tendency of 
everyday life to replicate the anonymity of the war experience. Adding 
this analysis suspends Bierce between two competing sets of stories that 
could be said to be going nowhere: “While his war-arrested mind led 
him to treat the day’s news as mere repetitions of the same old story, at 
least that mind was constantly forced to face up to its repetitive task 
and so freed of the dangers of self-hypnosis that constantly threatened 
the imitators of Poe” (169). These experiences thus may have provided 
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Bierce with the possibility of an almost eternal return of literary reserves, 
but they could not be integrated. Freed from many of the stagnant and 
stale topics of the day, Bierce must choose between the dull dailyness of 
the newly new “news” and his arrested bits of the suspended past. Thus, 
while these bits and shreds of narrative are indeed arresting, they remain 
fragmentary in their lack of integration. 
It also becomes clear that the very thing that gives Bierce’s narra-
tives their singularity, their phenomenological specificity, draws them 
away from being components of a reflective whole “self ”; instead they 
seem like random particles of sensory data. Bierce’s perspective in these 
autobiographical fragments, and his work in general, is limited to his 
perceptual experience. There are few examples of even the presence of 
other people, never mind an understanding of how they are experienc-
ing the time of the narrated events that they share with Bierce. And 
when other people do appear, any particularity of these other repre-
sented people tends to fall into generalizable—one might even say well-
regimented—groups. Despite this tight focalization, his narratives are 
always about specific events. Perception, as Cathy Davidson argues, is 
Bierce’s key technique. What she calls his “language of perception” can 
be seen in his frequent deployment of the image of a bodily response to 
external events in order to index an otherwise inaccessible interior 
state (7–9). Bierce does so in an attempt to recover clarity of vision 
from past events, but this vision is always concerned with what was 
perceivable to a subject—to him—within the time of these events. 
Unlike many traditional autobiographies, Bierce’s bits of narrative 
frequently lack the intrusion of his authorial voice in favor of remaining 
within first-person awareness. This approach serves to delink the phe-
nomenological experience of the event from a reflective whole self. 
Whereas Howells’s autobiographies introduce and work to maintain a 
large gap between the author as an older man looking backward and his 
generalized boy—the “my boy” of his narrative—Bierce cannot escape 
that he was, and to some extent still is, the subject of his experience. 
This is no simple denial of his particular experience; he reconstructs 
his past to insist on himself as a reliable witness. He writes explicitly 
from his perspective and often draws attention to the degree to which 
he represents himself as an embedded subject. In “What I Saw of 
Shiloh,” he positions himself thusly as a witnessing authority to the 
events related:
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In subordination to the design of this narrative, as defined by 
its title, the incidents related necessarily group themselves 
about my own personality as a center; and, as this center, during 
the few terrible hours of the engagement, maintained a vari-
able constant relation to the open field already mentioned, it is 
important that the reader should bear in mind the topographi-
cal and tactical features of the local situation. (642) 
His language of topography, which reflects his occupation as a topogra-
pher during the war, positions himself in relation to the events described 
while his method of recall requires him to reproduce the time of the 
event and the field of “variable constant relation.” Using one’s “person-
ality as a center,” however, leads not to the expected grounding of nar-
rative but further fragmentation of that personality—this is the converse 
of that we saw earlier in Crane’s representation of Henry Fleming as 
becoming-anonymous—and emerges from hypersubjective affective 
“bits” that fail to cohere into overarching meaning.
As Bierce’s formal construction of his prose indicates, the time and 
experience of the event can only be reconstructed through the reassem-
bly of his senses. In other words, he needs to recall a historical phenom-
enological experience through what might be thought of as the playback 
of a set of stored bodily sensations. We see an example of this device in 
the same “What I Saw of Shiloh” fragment:
And this was, O so long ago! How they come back to me—
dimly and brokenly, but with what a magic spell—those years 
of youth when I was soldiering! Again I hear the far warble of 
blown bugles. Again I see the tall, blue smoke of the camp-fires 
ascending from the dim valleys of Wonderland. There steals 
upon my sense the ghost of an odor from pines that canopy the 
ambuscade. I feel upon my cheek the morning mist that shrouds 
the hostile camp unaware of its doom, and my blood stirs at the 
ringing rifle-shot of the solitary sentinel. (677) 
These impressions come back as they were perhaps initially experi-
enced, as a set of fragmentary, or broken, and disconnected sensory 
experiences that collectively locate the subject-as-witness to an event. 
Bierce indexes the event through what he recalls, in his ordering, as his 
senses of hearing, sight, smell, and feeling. These descriptive detailing 
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fragments are, as I have argued, hypersubjective and they function, as 
Georg Lukács helpfully notes in his differentiation of narration from 
description, to bring about “a disintegration of the composition into 
disconnected and autonomous details” (132). The senses become, in 
Bierce’s reconstruction of the past, autonomous and circulating, like the 
narrative incidents themselves; they group around the soldier as anony-
mous subject, not as a unit of particular meaning. The singular and 
punctual burst of the “rifle-shot of the solitary sentinel” pulls these frag-
mented senses together. But they do not cohere; instead they seem like 
random bits of sensory experience. 
Any typical narrative from Bierce’s short story oeuvre has an affec-
tively charged transitional moment when the reader realizes that things 
are not what they appear to be. In his autobiographical work, we find 
moments that attempt to regain his state of consciousness during past 
traumatic events. His deployment of the same tropes that he under-
stands to be capable of giving rise to an affective response suggests that 
he might imaginatively return to such scenes armed with his favorite 
formal devices in order to duplicate the intensity of first-person percep-
tion within an event. In his “The Short Story” essay, he lays out his 
argument for the primacy of the affects: “All the arts are essentially one, 
address the same sensibilities, quickening the same emotions and sub-
ject to the same law and limitations of human attention” (235). It is an 
affective response that Bierce desires, but the “personality” that is the 
addressee of these emotions cannot guarantee integration.
The small sensorial event of “What I Saw of Shiloh” contains the 
basic elements from his “Short Story” essay that lead to an affective 
“quickening” of the senses, yet it ends with a moment of traumatic clo-
sure, the closing to the “magic spell” constructed by his narrative. By 
concluding this scene with the bullet shot, Bierce displaces what would 
have produced the connective link in order to return him to his present 
scene of writing. He thereby abruptly cuts short his narrative with a 
figure of substitution rather than closure. The primal scene for this nar-
rative punch is the moment of his wounding in June 1864 during the 
battle of Kennesaw Mountain. Bierce was shot in the head during the 
battle, and the resulting injury essentially put him out of commission 
for the remainder of the war. Within his autobiographical work, this 
traumatic event has been utterly displaced by scenes of substitution that 
function to repeat this moment of wounding, displacement that allows 
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him to produce a doubling of this event. By deferring any representa-
tion of this scene itself, he holds this event open to representation. 
Believing that art is an address to the senses that should provoke the 
emotions, he also figures these scenes of repetition, in which he reen-
acts his displaced and unrepresentable traumatic wounding, as funda-
mentally caused by exposure to these same emotions. Thus the “absent 
cause” of this primal scene is continually re-presented and reawakened 
in the service of his art.
The one mention of his wounding, in all of his autobiographical 
accounts, appears in the fragment titled “Four Days in Dixie.” This 
story also includes a representation of the repetition of the moment of 
wounding as caused by a set of specific symptoms, thus providing evi-
dence for the theorization of what might be termed the “after affects” of 
Bierce’s deindividuated sensorium. He contains the account of the 
wounding within a later period of lost consciousness that was produced 
by the sudden occurrence of these feelings. This passage thus displaces 
his first-person narration with a brief mention of this unnarrated event. 
In describing repetition of the wounding as caused by and in the terms 
of the same affects that he hopes to be produced by his aesthetic ideal 
as detailed in “The Short Story,” Bierce makes his text into an affective 
mise-en-abîme. 
At the battle of Kennesaw Mountain in the previous June I had 
been badly wounded in the head, and for three months was 
incapacitated for service. In truth, I had done no actual duty 
since, being then, as for many years afterward, subject to fits of 
fainting, sometimes without assignable immediate cause, but 
mostly when suffering from exposure, excitement or excessive 
fatigue. (689) 
Bierce describes his response to such extreme events, triggered by 
“exposure, excitement or excessive fatigue,” as if reenacting the moment 
of wounding.  The “actual” event itself lacks representation, and the 
phenomenological experiences that are his signature literary style are 
displaced in this passage by the stasis of incapacitation. The wounding 
produces more than a loss consciousness; it strips him of his identity. To 
have “no actual duty” is to have a job without a description, to be a 
subject without a mandate. This state is akin to what I have described 
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before as Bierce’s representation of becoming anonymous—it is hyper-
subjective and an embodied consciousness without particularity.
Perhaps Bierce’s discomfort with phenomenological specificity 
results from the fact that he is as anxious over the idea of a fixed identity 
as over the idea of anonymity. A glance at his fictional story “A Resumed 
Identity” (1908) suggests as much. This story opens with an unnamed, 
solitary man wandering around an almost barren hilltop attempting to 
figure out exactly where he is until he suddenly encounters another 
man, Dr. Stirling Malson, a country physician. The unnamed man 
immediately attempts to identify Dr. Malson as either a friend or foe, 
offering his own identity as a lieutenant on the staff of General Hazen. 
The man continues his line of inquiry, asking if Malson has heard any 
news about the battle. Malson dodges the questioning with his own; he 
asks whether the man has been injured. The lieutenant replies that he 
was grazed by a bullet to the head and has been unconscious for some 
time, but now, examining his fingers, he mysteriously can see no evi-
dence of his injury, no blood. Malson attempts to treat the man gently 
with his questions but is dismissed as being unhelpful. Then, continuing 
to wander around the hill, the lieutenant comes across a monument to 
General Hazen’s brigade and a commemorative note about the battle. 
In a moment of sudden realization, the lieutenant falls forward to his 
death in a pool of reflective water.
This story was most likely written after Bierce changed his mind 
about visiting former battlefields and about participating in commemo-
ration and memorial activities. There is evidence that he had visited 
one such location, Stone River, also the site of this story.7 I want to 
resist simply reading this story through the lens of Bierce’s biography—
despite my calling attention to the similarity of the head wound suf-
fered by this protagonist to Bierce’s own injury—proposing instead that 
we consider it as a theory of his own autobiographical project. Autobi-
ography, after all, is deeply concerned with creating the author’s self-
reflection and negotiating between the universal of understandable 
experience and the particularity of the author. 
While Bierce’s story seems to confirm that advice found in the 
second of the three section titles that divide the story—“When you 
have lost your life consult a physician” (300)—the ending complicates 
the placing of our trust in Dr. Malson and his amnesia cure. While 
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debating how to respond to the lieutenant, Malson “[recalls] much that 
is recorded in the books of his profession—something about lost iden-
tity and the effect of familiar scenes in restoring it” (301). Rather than 
following this advice and allowing this confused man to locate his “lost 
identity” on his own, Malson begins to ask why the lieutenant is not 
dressed as such and expresses his disbelief at the man’s reported age of 
twenty-three. Thus two versions of the cure are rejected: neither return-
ing to the past nor awareness of the radical disjuncture between past 
and present seems capable of restoring one’s former identity and 
enabling one to move forward. 
The target of any such cure, of course, is not exactly the amnesia of 
the past experienced by this soldier, but of the present and all that has 
happened since a single, particularizing point in history. Thus Bierce 
must also issue a caution against the dangers of the autobiographical proj-
ect by alerting the reader—as he puts it in the title of the final section—
to “the danger of looking into a pool of water” (302). It tells us that to 
have a single, frozen identity is worse than remaining anonymous. Writ-
ing autobiography, for Bierce, means risking a form of self-fixation, itself 
a form of defacement.8 To fix or complete a narrative, an event, or even 
an idea of the self is to produce closure. In other words, it would involve 
a commitment to what Friedrich Nietzsche calls monumental history, a 
mode—or, to use his term, “species”—of history in which the past exists 
in a fixed and unbroken relation to the present.9 The subject who frus-
trates this project does so out of a need for an open-ended, future-ori-
ented narrative as well as a reworkable past—one that is not trapped, like 
one of Bierce’s walking dead, within the confines of a now-impersonal 
singular identity. The de-completer of autobiographical narrative, then, 
does not yearn for a return of a lost wholeness, but rather holds to the 
problematic tensions between the bit and the totality. 
Bierce views himself partially through the identity he gained when a 
soldier in his twenty-third year of life. That Bierce deploys the term “bit” 
to describe the smallest part of his autobiographical writing should be rec-
ognized as his own admission of the partial nature of these works. These 
short narratives do not function exactly like synecdoche for the longer and 
unwritten life. Rather, these are key moments within his life narrative that 
share aspects with other narratives, and though incomplete they do not 
suggest that a “full” version of his autobiography could ever be written.
 Dartmouth College
 Bits of Autobiography 97
notes
I wish to express thanks to Jennifer L. Fleissner for numerous contributions to 
this essay and for sharing her syllabus for her “The Everyday” seminar with me. 
Thank you also to Jonathan Elmer for introducing me to Ambrose Bierce, to Donald 
E. Pease for his incisive and generous criticism, and finally to Louis A. Renza for his 
careful reading of this essay and for his continued sharpening of my understanding 
of autobiography.
1. This works according to the logic of what Barthes calls the “reality effect.” 
In several of his third-person authored autobiographies including A Boy’s Town 
(1890), Howells uses “bits” of the experience from a “specialized boy” to authorize 
the writing of what he terms his “boy in general,” his common story. The fiction of 
the generic boy is comforting to Howells but it requires the supplement of the spe-
cialized boy to make it the common story. We find a similar operation of what we 
can think of as the real of Howellsian realism in his fiction. The opening scene of 
Indian Summer features a busy Florence street scene and an anomalous figure with 
one leg, who is briefly mentioned and then quickly pushed from view, a trope How-
ells uses to establish the reality of his representation of this scene of everyday life.
2. Fussell examines representations of what he terms the “faceless young 
automatons” (67) as linked to growth of the mass media and the new methods of 
propaganda distributed by warring governments via these new media.
3. Warner’s understanding of the self-alienation required by what he terms 
“mass-public subjectivity” might also be a useful lens by which to examine the 
assent required to become an anonymous subject. He writes: “If mass-public subjec-
tivity has a kind of singularity, an undifferentiated extension to indefinite numbers 
of individuals, those individuals who make up the ‘we’ of the mass-public subject 
might have very different relations to it. It is at the very moment of recognizing 
ourselves as the mass subject, for example, that we also recognize ourselves as 
minority subjects. As participants in the mass subject, we are the ‘we’ that can 
describe our particular affiliations of class, gender, sexual orientation, race, or sub-
culture only as ‘they.’ This self-alienation is common to all of the contexts of pub-
licity, but it can be variously interpreted within each” (171).
4. See Simmel’s sociological analysis of the exchange of money as promoting 
anonymity in the urban market in his 1903 essay “The Metropolis and Mental Life” 
(324–38).
5. Blanchot’s conception of the everyday describes something that seems more 
like a modernist sense of everyday life by which meaning might be produced from 
the meaningless. Those dull, empty representations or, to put it in Blanchot’s terms, 
“nul moments,” in nineteenth-century realism are full of signification—they are not 
aestheticized insignificance. See also Olson.
6. In a sense this understanding of the everyday is opposed to de Certeau’s 
heroic “common man,” who lacks specificity but seems more like Howells’s generic 
boy than the more insidious figure that I wish to extract from Blanchot. 
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7. For a biographical reading of this story and details on Bierce’s travels in his 
final years, see Talley.
8. I use the term “defacement” here in order to gesture toward de Man’s well-
known account of autobiography as less a form of disclosure than of dis-enclosure: 
“The interest of autobiography, then, is not that it reveals reliable self-knowledge—
it does not—but that it demonstrates in a striking way the impossibility of closure 
and of totalization (that is the impossibility of coming into being) of all textual 
systems made up of tropological substitutions” (922).
9. Nietzsche critiques the monumental mode of history that seeks to frame the past 
as a chain of continuity that stretches across human history (69). Bierce’s “bits” can be 
thought of as links broken off from the chain of the monumental autobiography.
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